Foreign Affairs Documentation Bulletin, March 2016 |
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AFGHANISTAN 1. Barfield, Thomas 2. Baldino, Daniel and Carr, Andrew The practice of military-to-military engagement has been strongly embraced in the last few decades as a central tool for strategic management. Many governments in the Asia-Pacific, including Australia, have accepted the practice as an instrument of statecraft to achieve comprehensive strategic outcomes: as a means of defusing tensions, reducing hostility and shaping the behaviour of states towards each other. This article examines Australia's broad approach and practice, and argues that such transformative ambitions are overstated. The evidence suggests that the benefits from defence diplomacy are evident at the tactical and operational level. It is a mode to deal with precise and immediate security issues, as opposed to the moulding of major strategic settings. This indicates the need to better recognise the limitations and conceptual flaws of defence diplomacy, and to reformulate Australian defence channels and related engagement prescriptions towards a more cautious, pragmatic and ultimately security-related stance. Through the use of case-study analysis, this research identifies both opportunities and constraints in conducting defence diplomacy, while offering guidelines for its future implementation in the region. **Australia-Defence diplomacy; Australia-Defence force 3. Corbett, Jack and Dinnen, Sinclair On taking office in late 2013, the incoming Abbott government proclaimed the advent of a new aid paradigm. This article asks whether or not this is the case. It does so by situating the new coalition policy in the context of more than two decades of development thinking. Focusing on the way Australian aid policy reflects trends in both global development and geopolitical discourses, the article parses out continuity and change. It finds that Australia's new aid paradigm is in fact largely the old aid paradigm reincarnate, with aid policy continuing to follow the well-established parameters outlined over decades of global thinking and practice that emphasise the significance of private-sector-led economic growth. However, while the overarching paradigm remains relatively intact, incremental change is also apparent, including alterations to the geographic focus, level and administration of the program. **Australia-Foreign aid policy; Australia-Foreign policy; Australia-Economic growth 4. Abbott, Malcolm and Esposto, Alexis In more recent years, Australia's relations with the countries of Latin America have taken on more importance as the trade and investment links between the two regions have grown. Besides this recent activity, Australia has a long history of diplomatic relations with the countries of Latin America, even though the links between the two regions have at times been fairly superficial. This relationship, like many others, has tended to concentrate on mainly trade relations and, despite Latin America's often turbulent political history, has not been affected much at all by political issues. The purpose of this article is to analyse the development of foreign policy links between Australia and the countries of Latin America in their formulative stage between 1901 and 1973. **Australia-Foreign policy-Latin America; Australia-Foreign relations-Latin America 5. Brown, Kerry and Bretherton, Hannah Australia seems to have condemned itself to a template of its relations with the USA and China where security assurances reside with the former and economic with the latter. But this veneer of stability is misleading. Over the last decade, successive Australian prime ministers have ranged from describing China as a ‘true friend’ (Rudd in 2008) to one towards whom it feels ‘fear and greed’ (Abbott in 2014). This range betrays a policy void where the dominant Australian psyche is plagued by a perceived lack of power and fatalism. Policy towards China has become the victim of shifting ephemeral political trends driven by volatile emotions rather than a stronger, more level-headed long-term strategic vision. 6. Abimbola, Seye et. at. **Australia-Higher education; Australia-diplomacy-Africa; International scholarships 7. Satake, Tomohiko This article discusses how Japan and Australia could contribute to a liberal and inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region. Critics argue that closer ties between Japan and Australia could undermine the stability of regional security, dividing Asia into ‘mutually hostile armed blocs’ consisting of US allies and China. Contrary to such a view, this article argues that deepening and enhancing Japan–Australia security cooperation could, if carefully managed, help to maintain an inclusive regional order based on institutions, norms and values, as well as a stable balance of power relation. In particular, the article contends that Japan and Australia can contribute to regional order by strengthening their ‘middle-power cooperation’ through regional capacity-building, institution-building, rule-making or norm-setting, and coalition-building, while supporting the US military presence in the region. It then concludes that, despite differing attitudes towards Beijing, Tokyo and Canberra can further contribute to the longevity of the current regional order by inclusive institutional architecture and liberal norms and values. **Australia-Security partnership-Japan; Australia-Middle power cooperation-Japan; Asia-Pacific security 8. Kersten, Rikki On July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's cabinet commenced a historic transformation of post-war Japan's security policy by overturning previous interpretations of the constitution's pacifist clause, Article 9. The Cabinet Decision on the Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People stated that collective self-defence was consistent with the constitution and, consequently, Japan would immediately develop a more proactive and less constrained security policy. But while this outcome may seem sensible and overdue from a realist perspective of Japan's standing as a mature democratic nation in an increasingly difficult geopolitical situation, the manner in which it is being enacted may seriously undermine the normative legitimacy of Japan's new security identity. In this article, the author examines how Shinzō Abe's administration has attempted to shape the norms surrounding security policy revision in Japan, and how these norms, in turn, have affected or constrained Abe's agency. This is done with specific reference to the external contexts of the USA's ‘rebalance’ policy and the deepening of Japan's security relationship with Australia, with a view to anticipating how normative turmoil might impact on the potential of this relationship. **Australia-Security policy-Japan; Australia-Security relations-Japan 9. Schreer, Benjamin In July 2014, Australia's new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship'. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia's ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia's strategic interests in the face of China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China's uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan's ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China's leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become. **Australia-Strategic relationship-Japan; Australia-Defence relations Japan; Australia–Foreign relations-China 10. Shah, Aqil ** Bangladesh-Politics and government; Bangladesh-Democracy; Bangladesh-National identity; Bangladesh-Intolerance Control No : 42740 11. Warikoo, K India and Central Asia have shared a geo-cultural affinity and a long tradition of historical contacts that dates back to antiquity. There is convergence of views an interests between the Central Asian Republics and India, on fundamental issues such as; (a) need to maintain social harmony and equilibrium by promoting inter-ethnic harmony and peaceful co-existence; (b) commitment to secularism and democracy and opposition to religious fundamentalism; (c) recognition of threat to regional security and stability from trans-border terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, religious extremism and ethnic-religious secessionism; (d) commitment to the principles of territorial integrity of nation states and inviolability of state borders; (e) promoting economic, scientific and cultural cooperation and (f) ensuring peaceful and tranquil neighbourhood in Afghanistan. The Central Asian Republics, being cautious and wary of dominating influence of the powerful neighbours like Russia and China look towards India as a friend and partner, which does not have any political or territorial ambitions in the region. India is also expected to play a balancing role in the big power games in Central Asia. ** Central Asia-Trade relations-South Asia; South Asia-Trade and transit; Karakoram highway 12. Payette, Alex Since the early 1980s, China has witnessed a progressive Confucian revival, especially in the academic and cultural spheres. In particular, since the early 2000s, there has been a progressive expansion of Confucian groups arising from local initiatives all over China in the form of local colleges and study halls. Using four previously unexplored sites, this article studies the multiple modalities of local Confucian revival in the province of Shandong. Through interviews and extensive discussion with members of these groups, we have uncovered a strong adherence to Confucian elements and a convenient religiosity through ritual performances. Therefore, this article not only agrees with previously conducted studies on the revival of Confucianism in China but also adds new empirical elements supporting their conclusions. Finally, this article introduces the ‘Countryside Confucianism experiment’, its current meaning and ties to the ongoing local Confucian resurgence in the province of Shandong as well as its shared identity ‘closure’ characteristics, prevalent among some of these local sites’ narrative. **China-Contemporary confucianism; China-Countryside confucianism; China-Cultural resistance 13. Uberoi, Patricia This article takes a critical look at the new Chinese ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) or ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) for 21st century Eurasian connectivity and economic integration from the perspective of the proposed Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). The BCIM-EC is a sub-regional cooperation project that aims to link the land-locked provinces of southwest China with eastern India and the Bay of Bengal through northern Myanmar, India’s northeast region, and Bangladesh. However, within months of being mooted in May 2013, the BCIM-EC was yoked to another connectivity initiative, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the two encompassed within President Xi Jinping’s grand vision for a new overland and maritime Silk Road. As of now, India has (i) endorsed the BCIM-EC, (ii) rejected the CPEC and (iii) maintained studied silence on the OBOR initiative per se. Where does that conundrum leave the BCIM-EC? And to what extent, if at all, can India leverage OBOR to its own advantage? **China-Economic corridor; Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic 14. Hameiri, Shahar and Jones, Lee This article draws attention to the transformation of statehood under globalisation as a crucial dynamic shaping the emergence and conduct of ‘rising powers’. That states are becoming increasingly fragmented, decentralised and internationalised is noted by some international political economy and global governance scholars, but is neglected in International Relations treatments of rising powers. This article critiques this neglect, demonstrating the importance of state transformation in understanding emerging powers’ foreign and security policies, and their attempts to manage their increasingly transnational interests by promoting state transformation elsewhere, particularly in their near-abroad. It demonstrates the argument using the case of China, typically understood as a classical ‘Westphalian’ state. In reality, the Chinese state’s substantial disaggregation profoundly shapes its external conduct in overseas development assistance and conflict zones like the South China Sea, and in its promotion of extraterritorial governance arrangements in spaces like the Greater Mekong Subregion. 15. Jiang, Junyan and Yang, Dali L Despite its wide usage in explaining political dynamics of non-democracies, preference falsification remains an empirical myth for students of authoritarian politics due to the challenge of measurement. We offer the first quantitative study of this phenomenon in a non democratic setting by exploiting a rare coincidence between a major political purge in Shanghai, China, and the administration of a nationwide survey in 2006. We construct two synthetic measures for expressed and actual political support and track their changes before and after the purge. We find that the purge caused a dramatic increase in expressed support among Shanghai respondents, yet the increase was paralleled by an equally evident decline in actual support. We interpret this divergence as evidence for preference falsification and conduct a number of robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations. We also show that falsification was most intense among groups that had access to alternative information but were vulnerable to political sanctions. **China-Politics; China-Non-democratic regimes Countries often seek to resolve their disputes through negotiations. However, diplomats meeting face to face are under the incentives both to cooperate by revealing one’s preferences and to compete by misrepresenting them. How, then, do they express and assess each other’s intentions? Theories of International Relations that have studied communication in diplomacy — structural realism, rationalism, and the theory of communicative action — offer insufficient answers. To break through, I highlight the communicative function of emotions, leveraging insights from the latest research on negotiations in social and experimental psychology. I argue that when diplomats negotiate, they pay attention not only to what others say, but also to their emotional cues. One’s choice of words, tone of speech, and hand and body gestures carry emotive information that reflects how one appraises a situation. Diplomacy is therefore unique as a conduit between states because it enables practitioners to exchange individual-level expressions of intentions — and, by extension, the intentions of the government they represent — that are otherwise lost, attenuated, or distorted if communications were to occur through other impersonal and irregular channels. To illustrate my argument, I discuss episodes of face-to-face diplomacy during the Fashoda Crisis (1898), July Crisis (1914), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and US–Syria negotiations on the Middle East (1991). 17. Kaplan, Robert D China and Russia may forge a tactical alliance based on their compatible authoritarian systems and aimed at managing their frontier areas and standing up to the West. ** Eurasia-Economy; China-Economic Cooperation-Russia; Russian economic power 18. Maxwell, Rahsaan “The next generation of diverse Europeans will inhabit a world in which cultural mixtures are standard and historical nation-states are the starting points rather than the final definition of culture.” **Europe-Cultural diversity; Western Europe-Cultural diversity; Europeanization 20. Helbling, Marc and Traunmuller, Richard This article argues that governments play a considerable role in shaping citizens’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants through the way they regulate religion. European democracies are far from secular, and matters of religious regulation cannot be reduced to abstract values or constitutional clauses. Under conditions of high state support of religion, accommodating new religious minorities involves not only the changing of **Europe-Religion and politics; Europe-Muslim Immigrants The European Union is seen to operate at the international level by promoting ideas and values, rather than by exerting military or economic power. As a gender actor, the EU has played a key role in the development of formal equality, which is presented as a foundational principle of European integration. It therefore follows that normative power Europe should seek to promote these values in external affairs. This article interrogates the role of the EU as a normative gender actor in relation to its implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions. Documentary analysis will be supplemented by a detailed assessment of speeches and public statements about the role of the EU as a gender actor in external affairs. This data will be used to assess whether there is a disjuncture between the dominant narrative about gender equality as a fundamental value of the EU and the actions of the organization. It will also allow us to assess whether gender mainstreaming is a tool for public diplomacy or has made a significant change to the way the external relations agenda is formulated and implemented. Additionally, the article will draw attention to the institutional obstacles to the EU performing a role as a gender actor in external affairs. It identifies a critical tension between framing the WPS resolutions as an extension of the EU's equality on the one hand, and understanding that gender mainstreaming is a mere policy tool in international affairs. In doing so, it highlights how competing institutional demands can ultimately undermine core values (e.g.equality) when they are used instrumentally. ** Europe-Women peace and security; United Nations-Women peace and security; European 22. Müller, Jan-Werner “The EU will not become something like a traditional nation-state anytime soon, and no supranational public sphere is likely to ever replace national public spheres.” Fifth in a series on public spheres around the world. “Eastern Europe remains poorer and less democratically experienced than Western Europe, but there are as many differences within the regions as between them.” **European Union-expansion; Eastern Europe; Western Europe; European Union-Political culture; European Union-economic interests 24. Schreurs, Miranda A The Germans have been early adopters of green standards, and the state has set ambitious renewable-energy targets. But industrial lobbies can still thwart regulations, as the Volkswagen scandal revealed. **Germany-Environmental policy; Germany-Green culture “[O]rdinary Greeks intuitively understood better than many outsiders that the country had little future cut off from Europe.” ** Greece-Economic growth; Greece- economy; Greece-Anti-bailout camp; Tsipras 26. Bano, Sayeeda and Paswan, Nawal K **India- Trade relations-New Zealand; India-trade intensity; International trade 27. Chandra, Kanchan “Although the majority of elected members of Parliament in India now come from subaltern categories, they belong to parties that are dominated by the Hindu upper castes.” ** India-Politics and government; India-Subaltern politics; India-Subaltern groups; India-Vemula’s death “The public sphere of debate and discussion predicated on transparency has given way to a public sphere of image and spectacle.” Sixth in a series on public spheres around the world. **India-Politics and Government; India-Religious politics; India-Hindu populism 29. Lally, Jagjeet In the early twentieth century, the Salvation Army in British India transformed its public profile and standing, shifting from being an organization seen by the state as a threat to social order, to being partner to the state in the delivery of social welfare programmes. At the same time, the Army also shaped discussion and anxieties about the precarious position of India's economy and sought to intervene on behalf of the state—or to present itself as doing so—in the rescue of India's traditional industries. The Army was an important factor in debates about the future of traditional industries such as silkworm rearing and silk weaving, and was able to mobilize public opinion to press provincial governments for resources with which to try to resuscitate and rejuvenate India's silk industry. Although the Army's sericulture initiatives failed to thwart the decline of India's silk industry, they generated significant momentum, publicity, and public attention, to some extent transforming the Army's standing in British India and beyond. **India (British)-Salvation army; British India-Salvation army **International economy; USA-Economy An expansionary fiscal policy by the U.S. government can help overcome the secular stagnation problem and get growth back on track. An expansionary fiscal policy can reduce national savings, raise neutral real interest rates, and stimulate growth. Secular stagnation increases the danger of competitive monetary easing and even of currency wars. **Japan-Security policy; Japan-Collective self-defence Much of the existing ethnic politics literature suggests that in settings where ethnicity is politically salient, electoral competition encourages rival parties to focus narrowly on mobilizing their respective core ethnic constituents, a strategy that exacerbates ethnic divisions and may heighten the risk of conflict. This article develops an alternative account of campaign strategy that proposes that in highly diverse societies, an exclusive focus on core mobilization is likely to be an unattractive strategy. It argues that campaigns will be animated principally by the pursuit of swing voters outside of core strongholds, while the mobilization of core ethnic supporters will be delegated to lower level actors. To support these propositions, the article draws on data collected during Kenya’s 2007 presidential election. **Kenya-Election campaign; Kenya-Ethnic politics This article assesses how the political context shapes policy implementation in decentralized countries. It finds that effective implementation of non-contributory social policies depends on political alignments across different territorial levels. Subnational units governed by the opposition hinder the implementation of national policies, but only if the policy carries clear attribution of responsibility. On one hand, conditional cash transfers have clear attribution of responsibility and thus, pose risks for opposition subnational governments, who, as a result, have incentives to obstruct such policies. On the other hand, in social services, attribution of responsibility is blurred, and therefore their implementation is not shaped by political alignments. By analyzing policy implementation, disaggregating social policies, and incorporating multilevel political alignments, this article contributes to theories of the welfare state and multilevel governance. The empirical foundation includes an analysis of the factors that shape the successful implementation of social policies in Argentina and Brazil through a combination of pooled time-series analysis and extensive field research. **Latin America-Subnational politics; Brazil-Social welfare policies; Argentina-Social welfare policies 35. Snellinger, Amanda Nepal’s new constitution was supposed to cap a momentous decade that saw the end of the monarchy and civil war. But identity politics and economic discontent have called national unity into question. **Nepal-Nationalism; Nepal-Politics and government; Nepal-Madhesi movements 36. Magbadelo, John Olushola Successive Nigerian administrations have pursued one variant of reform or another in the federal civil service since the country’s attainment of political independence. Yet, the federal civil service, as an essential organ of the executive arm of the government, still requires more reforms. The problems that instigated the introduction of a series of reforms in the federal civil service in 1999 consequent upon the inauguration of the **Nigeria-Civil service; Nigeria-Public service reforms 37. Weiss, Anita **Pakistan-Civil society groups; Pakistan-Rural support programs network; Pakistan-Bacha Khan trust; Pakistan-NGOs -INTERNAL SECURITY The debate and discourse to change the provincial map of Pakistan by creating new provinces is not a new phenomenon and is considered as a major challenge to intra-national security and to the centripetal forces who still want Pakistan to be a unitary/centralised state instead of a federal state. What is intra-national security and how can the issue of creating new provinces have a major impact on the dynamics of national security at different levels? When compared with national security, which deals with the whole country, intra-national security relates to contradictions and variations in the security dynamics and paradigms in different parts of the country. Pakistan as a multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural and multi-religious state can effectively deal with issues of security if intra-national security is accepted as a reality and is beyond the scope of national security. Matters and issues relating to different regions of Pakistan located in its provinces can at best be understood in terms of intra-national security. If the approach of major power stakeholders in Pakistan is positive, and they wish to peacefully address issues that cause friction, instability, chaos, disorder and violence in different provinces because of social, economic and political injustices, they must seriously consider proposal to upgrade existing divisions of Pakistan into provinces. For that matter, proper brainstorming by the concerned stakeholders including civil society groups needs to be done so that consensus is reached on the methodology to create new provinces in Pakistan. **Pakistan-Internal Security; Pakistan-Intra national security; Pakistan-National Finance Commission 39. Reuter, Ora John et. at. Why do authoritarian regimes permit elections in some settings but not in others? Focusing on the decision to hold subnational elections, we argue that autocrats can use local elections to assuage powerful subnational elites. When subnational elites control significant political resources, such as local political machines, leaders may need to co-opt them to govern cost-effectively. Elections are an effective tool of co-optation because they provide elites with autonomy and the opportunity to cultivate their own power bases. We test this argument by analyzing variation in the decision to hold mayoral elections in Russia’s 207 largest cities between 2001 and 2012. Our findings suggest that Russian mayoral elections were more likely to be retained in cities where elected mayors sat atop strong political machines. Our findings also illustrate how subnational ** Russia-Elections; Russia-Non-democratic regimes The relative bargaining power of rulers and right holders is thought to be a key determinant of property rights, but because it both shapes and is shaped by property rights, it is difficult to estimate the impact of bargaining power on property rights. We take advantage of a natural experiment by comparing the responses of managers interviewed just before and just after a surprising parliamentary election in Russia that weakened the relative bargaining power of the ruling party. This electoral shock had little impact on the perceived property rights of the average firm, but firms with close economic ties to the state viewed their property as more vulnerable after the election. By exploiting largely exogenous variation in the timing of survey interviews, we estimate the impact of bargaining power on property rights with greater precision. We also contribute to the literature on elections under autocracy by focusing on their economic, rather than political, impacts on individuals. **Russia-Political economy; Russia-Elections; Russia-Voting behavior 41. Juan, Alexander De Does extraction increase the likelihood of antistate violence in the early phases of state-building processes? Although research has focused on the impacts of war on state building, the potential “war-making effects” of extraction have largely been neglected. The article provides the first quantitative analysis of these effects in the context of colonial state building. It focuses on the “Maji Maji” rebellion (1905-1907), the most substantial incidence of anticolonial violence in Eastern Africa. Analyses based on a new historical data set confirm the correlation between extraction and resistance. More importantly, they reveal that distinct strategies of extraction produced distinct outcomes. Although the intensification of extraction in state-held areas created grievances among the population, it did not drive the rebellion. Rather, the results indicate that the expansion of extractive authority threatened the interests of local elites and provoked effective resistance. This finding provides insights into the mechanisms driving the “extraction–coercion cycle” of state building.
42. Aistrope, Tim With the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the issue of domestic radicalisation has taken on renewed significance for Western democracies. In particular, attention has been drawn to the potency of ISIS engagement on social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Several governments have emphasised the importance of online programs aimed at undermining ISIS recruitment, including the use of state-run accounts on a variety of social media platforms to respond directly to ISIS messaging. This article assesses the viability of online counter-radicalisation by examining the effectiveness of similar programs at the US State Department over the last decade. The article argues that governments attempting to counter online radicalisation of their domestic populations must take seriously the significant shortcomings of these State Department programs. The most relevant issue in this regard is the recurring problem of credibility, when the authenticity of government information is undercut by the realities of foreign policy practice, and existing perceptions of hypocrisy and duplicity are reinforced in target audiences. **Terrorism; Social Media-Counterterrorism strategy; Islamic state of Iraq and Syria 43. Wallis, Joanne, Jeffery, Renee and Kent, Lia In recent years, the study and practice of political reconciliation has experienced a turn to hybridity. This turn has been defined by the increased rate at which liberal international and local peacebuilding practices, and their underlying ideas, have become merged, integrated or co-located in time and space. While hybrid approaches to reconciliation have been praised as an effective means of engaging local populations in peacebuilding operations, little attention has been paid to examining whether or not they also bring unintended negative consequences. Drawing on the cases of Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville, this article examines the potentially dark side of hybridity. It demonstrates that, in each of these cases, hybrid approaches to political reconciliation have brought both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side of the equation, hybridity has seen imported international approaches to reconciliation adapted to meet local demands and ensure resonance with local populations. On the negative side, however, the misappropriation and instrumentalisation of local practices within hybrid approaches has served to damage their legitimacy and to jeopardise their contributions to reconciliation. The article thus concludes that the existence and extent of this dark side necessitates a re-evaluation of how hybrid approaches to political reconciliation are planned and implemented. **Timor Leste-Political reconciliation; Solomon Islands-Political reconciliation; Bougainville - Political reconciliation 44. Hill, Christopher Since the loss of their empires, Britain and France have been seen as states in historical but still only relative decline: no longer great powers but not typical of the large category of middle-range powers. Despite financial constraints and limited size they retain their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council and continue to display the ambition to exert global influence. At times, London and Paris deal with this anomaly by acting in harness but at others their foreign policies diverge dramatically, not least because of the contrasting domestic traditions from which they emerge, and because of their differing roles within the European Union. This article assesses the capacity of these two notable states to maintain a leadingrole in international politics given their own uneasy relationship and the significant constraints which they now face, both external and internal. The article is a revised version of the Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, held at Chatham House, London, on 3 November 2015. ** UK-Foreign policy; France-Foreign policy 45. Aolain, Fionnuala Ni Recognizing the critique of sexual essentialism in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, this article moves beyond this familiar narrative to address the narrowness of conflict frames that have to date been engaged by the WPS agenda. The events of 11 September 2001 brought new urgency and vibrancy to state action in the realm of counterterrorism. This momentum was illustrated both by the response of national legal systems and by more concerted efforts to achieve multilateral and multilevel counterterrorism cooperation on the international level. Notably, terrorism and counterterrorism have long been of only marginal interest to mainstream feminist legal theorists. Until recently concerted analytical feminist scrutiny has been missing in the assessment of terrorism, radicalism and counterterrorism discourses. This article addresses the lack of attention to terrorism, counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives in the WPS mandate and its consequences for mainstreaming gender interests in foundational aspects of peace and security practice. Recent normative augmentations including UNSCR 2242 and the amplified mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to include gender considerations are assessed. The article argues that these moves to include gender come late, and on the terms set by security-minded states. The late attention to gender in counterterrorism leaves little capacity to produce an inclusive and reimagined feminist agenda addressing the causes conducive to the production of terrorism and the costs to women of counterterrorism strategies. This pessimistic assessment warns of the pitfalls of exclusion and inclusion in the new security regimes that have been fashioned post 9/11 by states. **United Nations-Women peace and security; European Union-Women peace and security; UN Security Council The United Nations Security Council has often been identified as a key actor responsible for the uneven trajectory of the international Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. It is, however, the Council members—who also seek to advance their national interest at this intergovernmental forum—that are pivotal in the Council's deliberations and shape its policies. Yet, little attention has been paid to this aspect of deliberative politics at the Council in feminist scholarship on WPS. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature. It notes that gender has increasingly become part of foreign policy interests of UN member states, as evidenced by practices such as invocation of ‘women's rights’ and ‘gender equality’ in broader international security policy discourse. The article demonstrates that this national interest in gender has featured in WPS-related developments at the Security Council. Using specific illustrations, it examines three sets of member states: the permanent and non-permanent members as well as non-members invited to take part in Council meetings. The main argument of this article relates to highlighting member states’ interests underpinning their diplomatic activities around WPS issues in the Security Council, with the aim to present a fuller understanding of political engagements with UNSCR 1325, the first WPS resolution, in its institutional home. ** United Nations-Women peace and security; European Union-Women peace and security; UN Security Council Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the woman-in-conflict has **United Nations-Women peace and security; European Union-Women peace and security; UN Security Council The aim of the eight Women, Peace and Security (WPS) United Nations Security Council resolutions, beginning with UNSCR 1325 in 2000, is to involve women in peacebuilding, reconstruction and gender mainstreaming efforts for gendered equality in international peace and security work. However, the resolutions make no mention of masculinity, femininity or the LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer) population. Throughout the WPS architecture the terms ‘gender’ and ‘women’ are often used interchangeably. As a result, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) tracking and monitoring fail to account for individuals who fall outside a heteronormative construction of who qualifies as ‘women’. Those vulnerable to insecurity and violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity remain largely neglected by the international peace and security community. Feminist security studies and emerging queer theory in international relations provide a framework to incorporate a gender perspective in WPS work that moves beyond a narrow, binary understanding of gender to begin to capture violence targeted at the LGBTQ population, particularly in efforts to address SGBV in conflict-related environments. The article also explores the ways in which a queer security analysis reveals the part heteronormativity and cisprivilege play in sustaining the current gap in analysis of gendered violence. **United Nations-Women peace and security; European Union-Women peace and security; UN Security Council
**United Nations-Women peace and security; European Union-Women peace and security; UN Security Council The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has developed at the United Nations over the course of the past 15 years, and there have been critical engagements with it for nearly as long. In this article, we first take stock of the operationalization of the WPS agenda, reviewing its implementation across a number of sectors. In the second section, we expose the tensions that have marked the WPS agenda from the start. With others, we argue that there has been a narrowing of the agenda's original scope, reducing it to the traditional politics of security rather than reimagining what security means. We highlight this reduction primarily through an analysis of the tension between the ‘participation’ and ‘protection’ pillars of the agenda. Further, we argue that the WPS agenda faces a current challenge in terms of the actors entrusted with it. Although in some ways involving civil society, the consolidations and implementation of WPS principles at the national and international levels have become increasingly state-centric. Third, we imagine some possible futures of the agenda, from a trajectory characterized by increasing marginalization or even irrelevance, to new avenues like the emergent, albeit tentative, ‘Men, Peace and Security’ agenda. We close with an argument for a revival of the WPS agenda beyond a fixation on states, beyond a narrow heteronormative or essentialist focus on the ‘Women’ of the WPS resolutions, and moving towards the radical reimagining of security as peace that inspired the original architects of these important resolutions. **United Nations-Women peace and security; European Union-Women peace and security; UN Security Council 51. Kirby, Paul and Shepherd, Laura J This special issue of International Affairs, launched on International Women's Day 2016, explores the potential and limits of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, a global policy architecture supporting gender equality and today a significant reference point in the management and resolution of, as well as recovery from, violent conflict. The Women, Peace and Security (conventionally abbreviated to WPS) agenda was formally inaugurated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000. Across 18 operative paragraphs, the Council appealed for the greater participation of women in decision-making in national, regional and international institutions; their further involvement in peacekeeping, field operations, mission consultation and peace negotiations; increased funding and other support for UN bodies’ gender work; enhanced state commitments to women's and girls’ human rights and their protection under international law; the introduction of special measures against sexual violence in armed conflict; and the consideration of women's and girls’ needs in humanitarian, refugee, disarmament and post-conflict settings. The foundational resolution also mandated the secretary-general both to study the impact of war on women and girls and to report back to the Council regularly **United Nations-Women peace and security; United Nations-Security council; European Union-Women peace and security YUGOSLAVIA Changing Frames of Reconciliation: The Politics of Peace-Building in the Former Yugoslavia In this article, we examine reconciliation as a category of political practice. More particularly, we explore the ways in which the term reconciliation has been employed and invested with meaning in the recent legal, social, and political discussions on transitional justice and EU accession in the former Yugoslavia. Much of the literature on the former Yugoslavia highlights the need for reconciliation and envisages it as the ultimate goal of a process of societal and political transformation. But what does reconciliation mean? Our assertion is that reconciliation is a dynamic term; its meaning varies across discursive fields and according to the implicit assumptions associated with it. This article investigates a number of ways in which the term reconciliation has been given meaning in the former Yugoslavia through an exploratory analysis of three related fields of political discussion: (1) transitional justice, in particular the arena of discursive interaction surrounding the completion of the activities of the ICTY in The Hague; (2) the human rights and enlargement agenda of the EU; and (3) local and regional civil society initiatives, including the RECOM initiative, which calls for the establishment of a mechanism for truth-telling and reconciliation across all the countries of the former Yugoslavia. On the basis of an analysis of public statements by politicians and activists, as well as some interviews with key actors in these three fields, we show that reconciliation is mobilized in varying and often conflicting ways. ** Yugoslavia-Peace Building; Yugoslavia-Reconciliation; European Union
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